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Realism, Anti-Realism, and Emmanuel 
Levinas* 
A. T. Nuyen / University of Queensland 
Religious realism is the view that religious languages and practices refer 
to a divine being or a divine reality that in fact exists independently of 
them. Furthermore, such being or reality confers meaning and value on 
the languages and the practices themselves. Religious antirealism, while 
advocating religions as meaningful and worthwhile, denies both of these 
views, holding instead that in fact there is no transcendent being or real- 
ity to which religious languages and practices refer and that the source 
of religious meaning and value lies in us, human beings. The debate in- 
volving realism and antirealism is still raging on. In the heat of the battle 
between realists and antirealists, it is easy enough to take for granted that 
to be religious, one has to be either a realist or an antirealist or perhaps 
somewhere in-between. For, despite their differences, both the realist and 
the antirealist agree that to be religious is to adopt a certain language 
and to engage in certain practices and to believe that they are in some 
way meaningful and valuable. It is difficult to imagine-and the combat- 
ants in the debate have so far failed to acknowledge-that it is possible to 
be religious in any other way. The aim of this article is to show that Levi- 
nas's ethical religion cuts right across the realism/antirealism debate and 
presents a serious challenge to the supposition that underlies that debate.' 
* I wish to thank the reviewers for the Journal of Religion for suggestions that have helped 
improve this article. 
' It has to be said that Levinas is not the first philosopher to advocate a view of religion 
that cuts across the realism/antirealism dichotomy. Many postmodernists, or poststructural- 
ists, may be said to have advocated similar views. Derrida is a case in point. I have discussed 
Derrida's religion elsewhere, in "Postmodern Theology and Postmodern Philosophy," Inter- 
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1991): 65-76. Before Derrida, one may cite 
thinkers such as William James, Wittgenstein, and Franz Rosenzweig. However, given the 
persistence of the realism/antirealism dichotomy, it is worth tilting at it again from a differ- 
ent position. C 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0022-4189/2001/8103-0003$02.00 
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I 
Don Cupitt is a self-confessed antirealist. For him, there is no god or 
divine reality existing independently of human thought and understand- 
ing. Nevertheless, he thinks that religions are worthwhile and valuable 
and urges that we take the god or divine reality spoken of in these reli- 
gions to refer to a human ideal, exalted enough to be worthy of worship. 
This makes him a religious antirealist rather than an antirealist who is 
also anti religion. In fact, he takes himself to be a Christian insofar as he 
adopts the language of Christianity and engages in Christian practices. 
He objects to realism on theoretical as well as practical grounds. Theoret- 
ically, realism has been thoroughly discredited by the intellectual move- 
ment that began some two hundred years ago, culminating in the post- 
modern rejection of eternal truths, absolute certainties, foundationalist 
principles, and universal values. Practically, realist religions have ad- 
versely affected the lives of countless people, and we are now all the better 
to be rid of them. As Cupitt tells us, in pre-Modern times, realist Christi- 
anity was combined with absolute monarchy to form "a tight system" with 
"a clear chain of command: God, Christ, the Pope, the King, the Church, 
and the State authorities." People were left "nothing ... except submis- 
sive acceptance of one's place in the all-powerful, all-knowing system."2 
The church, in particular, "had an exclusive franchise: it effectively con- 
trolled all communication between God and humans" and persecuted 
the "genuine thinker" and the "creative person," the mystics among 
them, who were "made to feel wicked all the way down, an abomination, 
someone who has no right to exist" (p. 16). Furthermore, to keep itself 
in business, the church, right up to today, must promise only to deliver 
salvation but never actually does so. For, "if Christ's redeeming work is 
done ... then clearly there is no longer any need for the Church as dis- 
tinct social institution, nor for priests and sacraments" (p. 49). With a real 
God either in the background or the foreground, the "religious profes- 
sionals" preached, "with remarkable success," a message that "most of our 
contemporaries still accept," namely, "human beings are wicked, they 
need to live subject to strong government, religious happiness is not avail- 
able in this life, and one must accept the authority of a powerful system 
of religious mediation" (pp. 55-56). It is just as well that the contempo- 
rary world has, in effect, rejected realism. We are now in a better position 
to carry out necessary religious reforms, to coexist in peace with and 
learn from other faiths, and to be religiously creative. 
2 Don Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity (Malden, Mass., and Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
p. 30. 
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Coming from a different direction but also challenging realism, Witt- 
gensteinians such as D. Z. Phillips argue that realists (and, for that mat- 
ter, antirealists such as Cupitt) make the mistake of assuming that reli- 
gious languages and practices necessarily refer to something.3 We can 
very well understand and indeed practice religions without worrying 
about whether the divine being invoked in them really exists. Beliefs in 
general are tied up in practices and make sense only in them. Religious 
beliefs are no exception. To say that one believes in God is just to behave 
in a certain way, and the ontological status of God drops out of the pic- 
ture. The question whether there is a god or some reality that exists inde- 
pendently of believers has no role to play in the believers' beliefs. If there 
is such a god, then the believers' statement that God exists is true, but 
the truth here does not make their believing any more or less meaningful. 
Wittgensteinians such as Phillips are often put in the same camp as the 
antirealists. However, while they share with the antirealists the view that 
religions are valuable and worthwhile and, in fact, practice some religion 
or another, they are not, strictly speaking, committed at the ontological 
level, realistically or antirealistically. For them, the reality of God is an ir- 
relevant question. They are nonrealists rather than antirealists. 
Against Cupitt, religious realists, Christians in particular, argue that 
the history of a religion such as Christianity, even if Cupitt has got it right, 
is no argument against realism. Stephen Davis, in particular, does not 
even think that Cupitt has got it right.4 Indeed, he believes that Cupitt of- 
fers us an absurd parody of Christianity: "It is almost as if being an ortho- 
dox Christian ... is an exercise in sheer buffoonery." The case against 
realism has to be established on the theoretical level, but here, Davis 
believes, Cupitt saddles realism with "all sorts of bizarre intellectual bag- 
gage-much of which would only startle most realists" (p. 56). Not both- 
ered by Cupitt's negative case, realists typically focus on the positive case 
for realism and insist that religious languages and practices lose their 
meaning, perhaps value as well, without at least supposing that there is a 
transcendent divine being or reality that is the source of such meaning 
and value, a being or reality to whom or to which the worshipper stands 
in a spiritual relationship. John Hick has pointed out that this is particu- 
larly so for most ordinary worshipers, who do not have a sophisticated 
sense of autonomy to substitute for themselves a real God as the source 
of religious meaning and value.5 More than this, Stephen Davis claims 
3 D. Z. Phillips, "On Really Believing," in Is God Real? ed. Joseph Runzo (New York: 
St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 85-108. 
4 Stephen T. Davis, "Against "Anti-realistic Faith,'" in Runzo, ed., pp. 56-59 
5 John Hick, "Religious Realism and Non-realism: Defining the Issue," in Runzo, ed., 
pp. 3-16. 
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that the "essence of religion" lies in our appropriate response to "a call 
from God," not a spirituality that is no more than "a certain sort of psy- 
chological state" (pp. 58-59). In a similar way, Brian Hebblethwaite in- 
sists that "the heart of the Judaeo-Christian tradition has been a matter 
of discovery and experience ... of a relation between believers and an 
all-surpassing personal and spiritual resource that creates, enables and 
sustains their faith and spirituality."6 Without a real God, traditional 
Christian ideas such as grace have no meaning. Religious practices, too, 
will lose their meaning and value. Hebblethwaite argues that "worship" 
is an "intentional verb," and without a real God, worship "loses its inten- 
tionality" (p. 139). The theoretical case for realism outlined here is sup- 
posed to withstand the linguistic objection as well, the objection raised 
by Wittgensteinians such as D. Z. Phillips. Against them, realists insist that 
there can be no meaning and value without truth. The ontological status 
of the object of worship determines the truth of religious beliefs and so 
does not drop out of the debate but, rather, is at the heart of the mat- 
ter. What is not at the heart of the matter is whether and how we can 
have access to religious truths. Some realists try to rework the old logical 
proofs, others the empirical proofs, others still are content to leave it all 
to faith. 
The brief survey of the realism/antirealism debate above serves to make 
clear that it is supposed by all concerned that religious persons are either 
realists, or antirealists, or perhaps nonrealists in the way that Phillips is. 
In all cases, religious languages and practices are necessary, however we 
think of the reality of the object of worship. Wondering whether "we are 
really faced with an either/or choice between religious realism and non- 
realism" and asking whether "there (may) not be intermediate possibili- 
ties," John Hick emphatically replies, "I think not."7 Notice that in this 
emphatic denial, Hick does not even entertain any possibility that is out- 
side the realist/nonrealist/antirealist continuum. In what follows, pace 
Hick, I outline another way of being religious, the Levinasian way.8 
II 
According to Cupitt, there are writers who "argue that in one's experience 
of a fellow-human being there is something immeasurable, ultimate, and 
so implicitly theological (Martin Buber, and perhaps Emmanuel Levinas)." 
6 Brian Hebblethwaite, "A Critique of Don Cupitt's Christian Buddhism," in Runzo, ed., 
pp. 135-48, at p. 137. 
7 Hick, p. 15. 
8 It may be said that the realist/antirealist debate, as it is presented here, is a product of 
analytic philosophy and as such it has no relevance to Levinas, in that Levinas comes from 
a different philosophical tradition. However, since my concern is to draw out religious im- 
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Clearly, Cupitt thinks of Levinas as a theological realist, albeit with some 
hesitation. As we shall see, the complexity of Levinas's position is such 
that the hesitation is at once entirely justified and yet unnecessary. It is 
true that, for Levinas, there is something "theological" in "one's experi- 
ence of a fellow-human being." But it is not true that, as Cupitt implies a 
few lines before and a few lines after the passage just quoted, Levinas is 
one of those "late-Modern" writers who tries to develop "a whole range 
of new-style theistic proofs."9 To understand Levinas's position, we need 
to understand his phenomenological account of the experience of subjec- 
tivity. 
In his various writings, Levinas employs the term l'Autrui, often trans- 
lated as "the Other," to refer to one's fellow human beings, the indefinite 
neighbors, strangers, widows, and orphans, and the term l'Autre, often 
translated as "the other," to refer to what lies beyond the totality that is 
one's own being, beyond what constitutes one's essence, a realm to which 
the Other belongs. The empirical world that one knows is called "the 
said" (le dit), because all the things in that world are known through what 
is said about them, through our own thematization or conceptualization 
of them. The realm of the other is called "the saying" (le dire), because we 
are aware of it only through what it says to us rather than through our 
thematization. As a totality, I belongs to the world of the said, having an 
essence that can be thematized, a being that can be conceptualized-for 
instance, thematized and conceptualized in science or in traditional phi- 
losophy. However, this I is utterly devoid of any subjectivity. In Totality 
and Infinity Levinas embarks on a phenomenological journey, tracing the 
subjectivity of the I.10 
As is the case with any classical phenomenology, Levinas begins with 
the mundane experiences of the I, showing that the I acquires its unique 
identity, or its "unicity," by separating or isolating itself from what is not 
itself in the activity of enjoyment. It is in enjoyment that one is aware of 
one's own happiness and unhappiness, thus aware of one's own ipseity. 
Yet, in the very process of enjoying, I come to be aware that I am much 
more than my own enjoyment. The enjoyment in which I am absolutely 
for myself "assuredly does not render the concrete man."" For, in the 
process of enjoyment, the I engages in a commerce with the Other, and 
plications from philosophical debates, bringing different philosophical traditions together 
only serves to highlight the fact that religious interest stands above traditions. At any rate, 
in the case of at least one participant in the realist/antirealist debate, Don Cupitt, the think- 
ing cuts across the analytic Continental Divide. 
9 Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity, p. 36. 
10 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969). 
" Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 139. 
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in that commerce, the I realizes soon enough that the Other possesses a 
radical alterity that cannot be thematized and so cannot be absorbed into 
the totality of one's being or become part of one's essence. In an argument 
that I will try to flesh out below, Levinas claims that the I realizes soon 
enough that the Other comes to it from the hither side of its being, from 
the realm of the saying, and steadfastly maintains his "strangeness, ... 
his very freedom" (p. 69). The more I thematize and totalize the Other, 
the more I realize that the Other is "absolutely foreign to me-refractory 
to every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classi- 
fication," that "he is not under a category," having "only a reference to him- 
self," having "no quiddity" (p. 69; emphasis in the original). Thus, in com- 
ing face to face with the Other, I come face to face with the other, with 
transcendence itself. My commerce with the Other reveals the saying of 
the other to me. 
Why is "the revelation of the other" important to me?12 It is so because 
it is only through the revelation of the other that I can confirm my own 
subjectivity. Typically, Levinas's arguments are indirect, but the logical 
premises appear to be the following. To be an I with full subjectivity is to 
be aware of one's own ipseity, to be aware of oneself as a unique identity 
or as a "unicity." The I, then, must be completely separated from what is 
not itself and, furthermore, must have an awareness of this separation. 
To say the same thing differently, the I must be aware of the limits of its 
own being. As Hegel has shown us, the idea of the limit implies the idea 
of the beyond, of that which lies on the other side of the limit. Thus, the 
separation that constitutes the I requires awareness of what lies on the 
hither side of one's own being. This is why to be totally absorbed in one's 
being in enjoyment without this awareness, to be "absolutely for myself," 
is not to be "the concrete man." It follows that subjectivity is confirmed 
only when there is an awareness of what is radically other than oneself, 
of radical alterity. As Levinas puts it in Otherwise than Being, the subjectiv- 
ity of the I is constituted as a "node and a denouement" of being and the 
otherwise than being, "of essence and the essence's other."'13 The next 
step in the argument is to show that it is in my commerce with the Other, 
with my fellow human beings, that I can satisfy the metaphysical desire 
for subjectivity, which is logically the desire for what is absolutely other, 
for infinity, for transcendence. 
In my commerce with my fellow human beings, there is a tendency to 
conceptualize and thematize them and deal with them out of a concern 
for my own being rather than to see them as radically other than myself. 
12 Ibid., p. 73. 
13 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1981), p. 10. 
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To conceptualize and to thematize others is to reduce them to the catego- 
ries of my own thought, to bring them within the limits of my being. To 
deal with them out of a concern for my own being is to see them as noth- 
ing but extensions of oneself. Fortunately, for someone who tries to secure 
subjectivity, I can never successfully do this to my fellow human beings 
or to the Other. A little reflection on what it means to thematize and 
conceptualize the Other will be sufficient to demonstrate this. In Of God 
Who Comes to Mind, Levinas points out that to perceive the Other is al- 
ready to grasp, and the grasping is complete when we put the Other in a 
concept: "Already perception grasps; and the Begriff [concept] preserves 
this meaning of ascendancy."'4 It is through thoughts and concepts that 
the I "identifies itself [and] returns to itself," like Ulysses returning to 
Ithaca (p. 17). Thus, in conceptualization and thematization, there is no 
"revelation of the other." But I can recognize the radical alterity of the 
Other even without this kind of reflection. I already know this in my 
commerce with the Other, a commerce that has to be conducted in lan- 
guage, and I realize that in language the meanings of my utterances de- 
pend not only on me but also on my interlocutors. As Levinas puts it, the 
"relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the 
revelation of the other to me."'5 
For Levinas, then, I can only maintain and identify myself by main- 
taining the world as a radical, absolute other, not absorbing it into the 
totality of my being. That is, I have to face the Other as coming from a 
realm that transcends the totality of my being, that goes beyond my es- 
sence, the realm of infinity. I have to recognize in the face of the Other 
the face of infinity itself. How is this is recognition to be attained? Levi- 
nas's answer is that I have to break out of my "egoist and solitary enjoy- 
ment" and welcome the Other in my home, offering "things which are 
mine" to him.16 To exist as an I in its full subjectivity is to "exist other- 
wise," and to exist otherwise is to exist "for another" (p. 261). This means 
to exist with a responsibility for the Other, for my neighbor, for the 
stranger, the widow, the orphan. In doing so, I call into question my very 
own existence, my very own spontaneity. This is what it means to exist in 
the "node and denouement" of being and the otherwise than being, of 
essence and the beyond essence. It is neither to be totally absorbed in 
the totality of one's own being nor to transcend oneself in transcendental 
idealism. As is well known, Levinas refers to this way of existing as ex- 
isting ethically: "We call this calling into question ... by the presence of 
14 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 87. 
'5 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 73. 
16 Ibid., p. 76. 
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the Other ethics" (p. 43). More specifically, it means that I must see myself 
as being responsible for the Other. "To utter 'I,' to affirm the irreducible 
singularity, ... means to possess a privileged place with regard to respon- 
sibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one can 
release me" (p. 245). Seeing myself as responsible for the Other is a mat- 
ter of being sensible to what I already possess, a "privileged place with 
regard to responsibilities"; it is not a matter of choice. Responsibility for 
the Other is not something that the I in its full subjectivity chooses to as- 
sume. Rather, it is a responsibility that arises prior to the emergence of the 
I and "confirms the subjectivity" of the I (p. 245). Thus, it is prior to any 
choice I make, prior to freedom. Prior to my freedom and yet I can rec- 
ognize it in the gaze of the Other. The Other has a face, and its "gaze is 
precisely the epiphany of the face as a face" (p. 75). Indeed, I cannot avoid 
the gaze of the Other. "I cannot evade by silence the discourse which 
the epiphany that occurs as a face opens" (p. 201). I do not choose to 
assume the responsibility for the Other; I am chosen. Being chosen, I 
cannot shirk this responsibility: "To be unable to shirk: this is the I" 
(p. 245). 
The nature of the primordial responsibility for the Other is elaborated 
further in Otherwise than Being. Here, responsibility is expressed as a com- 
mand from the Other: the Other "commands me and ordains me" as "the 
first on the scene, and makes me approach him, makes me his neigh- 
bor."17 Levinas likens this condition of being commanded by the Other to 
being a hostage. In this condition the subject is like a "hostage who sub- 
stitutes himself for the others" (p. 15). The substitution in question is or- 
dained, or commanded; it is not one chosen by the subject. The ideas of 
"hostage" and "substitution" highlight the radical nature of responsibility. 
They highlight the fact that responsibility bears down upon the subject 
prior to any volition, prior to freedom. The subject is in responsibility in 
a "passivity more passive than all passivity" (p. 15). Such passivity is pre- 
cisely the passivity of the hostage. This is why Levinas says that responsi- 
bility is something that the I, in its full subjectivity, cannot shirk. My very 
own identity "comes from the impossibility of escaping responsibility" 
(p. 14). What is it that I am responsible for? For "the faults and misfor- 
tune of others" (p. 10), for their "outrage and wounding" (p. 55). How far 
am I responsible? To the point of "ultimate offering (of) oneself, or suffer- 
ing in the offering of oneself" (p. 54), to the point of giving to others "even 
the bread out of one's own mouth and the coat from one's shoulders" 
(p. 55), to the point of saying, as God does in Isaiah 58, "Here I am (me 
voici)" (p. 146). Such is the subjectivity of the I: "The word I means here I 
~7 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 11. 
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am, answering for everything and for everyone" (p. 114). In the subjec- 
tivity of the I, "there is substitution for another, expiation for another" 
(p. 125), a "there is [that] strikes with absurdity" (p. 164). 
III 
We are now in the position to explore the religiousness of Levinas's ethical 
existing. As we would expect, it is in his more recent works, Otherwise than 
Being and particularly Of God Who Comes to Mind, that Levinas explicitly 
equates the radical alterity possessed by the Other, the infinity that lies 
on the hither side of my being, beyond my essence, with the Infinite, or 
God. Thus, it is in the face of the Other that I can recognize the trace 
of "irreducible alterity, the 'un-containable,' the Infinite or God."'8 Face 
to face, I am aware of a sense of being commanded by the Other that is 
wholly other, of being drawn toward an infinity beyond my comprehen- 
sion, an infinity whose "infinition ... comes from a past more distant 
than that which is within the reach of memory," an infinity whose "glory 
breaks up themes and. .. signifies positively the extraditing of the subject 
... to what it has never assumed."19 When we reflect on the nature of our 
experience of the radical alterity of the Other, on the irresistible com- 
mand that comes from the infinite saying, we cannot fail to appreciate the 
power and the glory of the saying, to look upon it "with awe and admira- 
tion," to borrow a phrase from Kant. If the name "God" or "the Infinite" 
designates a source of power and glory that is admirable and awesome, 
then it is an appropriate name for that which is insinuated in the experi- 
ence of the Other. Thus, the "glory of the Infinite is glorified in [the] 
responsibility" that is the command to substitute oneself for the Other 
(p. 144). In being responsible for my neighbor, in saying "here I am," "I 
bear witness to the Infinite," not an Infinite that is "in front of" me but 
a "thought behind thoughts ... too lofty to push itself up front." It is in 
this way that "the 'here I am' signifies in me the name of God." It is in 
this way that to welcome the stranger, to share the food from one's mouth 
and the coat from one's shoulder, is really to say, "'Here I am, in the name 
of God,' without referring myself directly to his presence" (p. 149). In this 
way, claims Levinas, the "old biblical theme of man made in the image of 
God takes on a new meaning, but it is in the 'you' and not in the 'I' that 
this resemblance is announced."'20 To be sure, it is not the case that "the 
other man must be taken for God or that God, the Eternal Thou, be 
found simply in some extension of the You." Rather, it is in my being 
'~ Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, p. 50. 
'~ Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 144. 
20 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, p. 148. 
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hostage to a "you" that the word "God," "this immeasurable word ... 
signifies for thought" (p. 151). 
The Levinasian way to God, then, is to make oneself hostage to the 
Other: "The very movement that leads to another leads to God."21 It is 
neither the rational process of proving the existence of God nor the wit- 
nessing of God "in front of" me. As Levinas puts it, the subject as hostage 
"has been neither the experience nor the proof of the Infinite, but the 
witnessing of the Infinite, a modality of this glory, a witnessing that no 
disclosure has preceded" (p. 73). Nevertheless, the God that I bear wit- 
ness to in being responsible for my neighbor cannot fail to astonish me: 
"An astonishment like this does not depend on the 'quiddity' of that 
which astonishes, but on the how of the relation to things" (p. 40). Spe- 
cifically, it depends on my relation to the Other. Indeed, waiting to be 
astonished in a determinate way is to wait in vain for the simple reason 
that "determinate waitings deceive, filled as they are by that which corre- 
sponds to a grasp and a comprehension," whereas that which astonishes can 
neither be grasped nor comprehended. By contrast, the time of responsi- 
bility is a time "as an awaiting-as patience, more passive than any passiv- 
ity correlative of acts-[which] awaits the ungraspable" (p. 50). The reli- 
gious person in the Levinasian sense is not religious in the sense, realist 
or otherwise, of addressing God in a religious language and in religious 
practices but in the sense that, in asking about the neighbor rather than 
asking for God, he or she is really seeking God. Indeed, given Levinas's ar- 
guments, it is in being responsible for the Other, not determinately seek- 
ing God, that he or she manages to find God. As Levinas puts it, the 
"word of the prophet (Isa. 65:1) ... expresses this admirably. 'I am sought 
of them that asked not for me, I am found of them that sought me not'" 
(p. 51). 
If to be religious is to belong to some organized religion, to adopt its 
language, and to engage in its practices, with a certain degree of sincerity 
and commitment to be sure, then the experience of radical responsibility 
for the Other is not sufficient to make one religious. If, on the other 
hand, to be religious is to seek a spiritual experience of transcendence, 
to have a desire for the Infinite, to wish to transcend the empirical world 
of the here and now, the said, to yearn for what is beyond, to seek spiritual 
salvation from the heaviness of being, then the recognition of radical re- 
sponsibility is the most religious moment in the life of a subject. The I 
practices religion when it substitutes itself for the Other, as a hostage. 
The I speaks a religious language when it says "here I am" to one that 
cries. The I is religious when it is ethical. As such, the I is not led, even 
21 Ibid., p. 148. 
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inevitably and inexorably, to religion by being ethical, like the Kantian 
subject. The I is already there, in religion, in being ethical. For Kant, 
there is a distance still to cross between ethics and religion. That is be- 
cause Kantian ethics is found in the very heart of being, in the reason of 
the I, the very essence of the subject. For Levinas, by contrast, responsibil- 
ity takes "place" at the juncture of being and the realm that is otherwise 
than being, at the "node" of essence and what is beyond essence, in the 
proximity of totality and infinity. It is a "place" that is a nonplace, a 
u-topos, a utopia. Thus, for Levinas, to be ethical is to be already in the 
religious utopia. For Levinas, the saying of the words "here I am" consti- 
tutes "the first religious service, the first prayer, the first liturgy." They are 
the words "out of which God could first have come to mind" and by which 
"the word 'God' [could] have made its entry into language."22 
Levinas himself has no doubt that the God who comes to his mind is 
none other than the God of the Bible, and he moves easily from his ethi- 
cal language to the language of the Bible. This is evident, as we have seen, 
in his reading of "here I am" in Isaiah 58, of the idea of human beings 
created in God's image, and of Isa. 65:1. Elsewhere, Levinas urges that 
we interpret key references to God as references to the Other. Thus, he 
reminds us that "the formula 'fear of God' appears . .. in a series of verses 
that especially enjoin respect for man and concern for the neighbor," such 
as "not to place an obstacle on the path of a blind man" (Lev. 19:14), "not 
to wrong one another" (Lev. 25:17), "not to accept interest, nor profit 
from a fallen brother, though he be a stranger or a newcomer" (Lev. 
25:16), and so forth. It is "as though the 'fear of God' were defined by 
these ethical injunctions; as though the 'fear of God' were this fear for 
another."23 Certain biblical concepts are also seen by Levinas as inter- 
changeable with ethical concepts. We have seen that the idea of revelation 
becomes the "revelation of the other." Likewise, the miracle of creation is 
"the creating of a moral being."24 Given this interchangeability, the lan- 
guage of ethics is a religious language, a Judaeo-Christian one, and the 
ethical practices with respect to the Other are religious practices. If Levi- 
nas is right, one can be religious by just being ethical, without referring to 
God or conceiving of God in any way and without adopting any particular 
religious language and engaging in any practices stipulated by any reli- 
gion. In other words, to be religious, one does not have to be either a 
realist or a nonrealist or an antirealist. One can simply be responsible for 
the Other, fear for the Other, and substitute oneself for the Other, as a 
hostage. Indeed, the realist, the antirealist, and the nonrealist could well 
22 Ibid., p. 151. 
23 Ibid., p. 149. 
24 Levinas, Totality and Infinity (n. 10 above), p. 89. 
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be irreligious in the Levinasian sense. I turn now to the challenge that 
Levinas presents to religious realism, antirealism, and nonrealism. 
IV 
Levinas's ethical religion is a challenge to both realism and antirealism, 
and anything in between, insofar as it points to a way of being religious 
that is outside of the realism/antirealism continuum. We saw earlier that 
John Hick does not think that there exists any possibility outside of the 
"either/or choice between religious realism and nonrealism." As if having 
Hick's conviction in mind, Levinas writes: "That a discourse might speak 
otherwise than to say what has been seen or heard outside, or felt inter- 
nally, remains unsuspected."25 It seems that neither the realist nor the 
antirealist suspects that one can be religious, not in being engaged in a 
discourse that speaks of God, whatever God's ontological status, and in 
practices specified in such discourse, but in being engaged in a discourse 
of an entirely different kind, a discourse in which "God is pulled out of 
objectivity, out of presence and out of being," the discourse of radical 
responsibility for the Other (p. 69). Furthermore, if Levinas is right, the 
Levinasian way of being religious is the only way to God insofar as God 
is "sought of them that asked not for [him, and] found of them that 
sought [him] not" (p. 51). This is the real challenge to realism and antire- 
alism. 
It is easy enough to see how Levinasian religion is a challenge to reli- 
gious antirealism (and nonrealism). Since the antirealist does not believe 
in, and the nonrealist is not committed to, a divine being or reality tran- 
scending us, they can be religious only in the sense of belonging to some 
organized religion, or adopting a religious language, or engaging in cer- 
tain religious practices (in all cases, without any realist commitments). 
The question is whether this sense of being religious is adequate. It seems 
reasonable enough to ask whether antirealism and nonrealism leave 
enough room for spiritual developments, where "spiritual" refers to the 
desire for and the experiences of uplifting moments, raising the person 
above the physical plane of his or her mundane existence. No doubt, both 
antirealists and nonrealists insist that their kinds of religion are more 
than adequate on this score. Cupitt, for example, finds it spiritually up- 
lifting to know that our world is the only world there is and that in our 
world there are no absolutes and no certainties, only secondariness and 
contingencies. Having been convinced of this, he feels "spiritually liber- 
ated, cleansed, unaccountable, carefree, floating [and] religiously won- 
25 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind (n. 14 above), p. 62. 
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derful."26 Indeed, he is convinced that "the non-realistic account of God 
is alone religiously adequate."27 
Without doubting the antirealists' sincerity, it may still be wondered 
whether they have not misdescribed their feelings as spiritual and reli- 
gious. On the surface, Cupitt's feeling of liberation appears to be episte- 
mic in nature, the feeling of being intellectually liberated from epistemic 
constraints imposed by the standards of absolutes and certainties. If this 
is the true source of the feelings of being "spiritually liberated" and "reli- 
giously wonderful," then they are at best metaphorically spiritual and reli- 
gious. In fact, such feelings seem to be the exact opposite of uplifting. 
Given Cupitt's own arguments, they are the feelings of coming down to 
earth resulting from deflationary views about truth, value, and holiness. 
They are not the feelings of someone who experiences transcendence but 
quite the opposite, the feelings of someone who has finally returned to 
his or her self, to his or her own place, to home-the feelings of Ulysses 
returning to Ithaca. Indeed, again given Cupitt's arguments, they are the 
feelings of someone realizing that he or she has never left home in the 
first place. The source of Cupitt's spiritual liberation and religious happi- 
ness is the fountain of life in our very own backyard, or what he calls "The 
Fountain," not a "beyond" to which our spirit can be uplifted.28 This is 
not to say that the antirealist is necessarily self-serving or egoistic. We can 
accept Cupitt's argument that antirealism deemphasizes the self and leads 
away from egoism. However, this is merely a shift in the center of gravity, 
away from one place on earth to another, a change in outlook, away from 
oneself toward others. In all this shift and change, one's feet are still 
firmly set on the ground, and one's self is still clearly reflected in the new 
vision. To be sure, such shift and change may be enough to generate 
feelings that have the same phenomenology as those that are truly uplift- 
ing and religious, but arguably they are of an entirely different kind. 
For Levinas, radical responsibility calls for the leaving of the totality 
that is one's being, one's essence, leaving without returning, leaving for 
a nonplace, for a utopia that is not a home and not here on earth. In 
responsibility, we face the Other as radically other, thus coming face-to- 
face with transcendence, turning out from the totality of being toward 
the infinity of the otherwise than being, thus bearing witness to the Infi- 
nite, to holiness itself. It is in this way that the feelings of responsibility 
are truly uplifting, spiritual, and religious. The liberation in Levinas's 
religion is the liberation from the grips of being, from the pull of essence, 
26 Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity (n. 2 above), p. 128. 
27 Don Cupitt, "The Religious Adequacy of Non-realism," in Runzo, ed. (n. 3 above), 
pp. 199-200, at p. 200. 
28 Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity, pp. 131-35. 
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not from thoughts and ideas that circumscribe being and essence. For 
Cupitt, to be liberated is to be in an enlarged totality, which just happens 
to have more room for others and in which the self is more diluted. In 
this sense, that which is liberated is being itself, and to be liberated is still 
to be gripped by being. For Levinas, it is to be uplifted from the totality 
of being altogether. The liberated person is uplifted toward the otherwise 
than being and the beyond of essence. Thus, it is the face-to-face experi- 
ence in which we respond to the radical command of the Other that is 
truly spiritual and religious. The Levinasian position challenges antireal- 
ism to show how the rejection of transcendence and the return to the 
only world we know, to the God of our own construction for our own 
purposes, can produce spiritual liberation and religious happiness. 
For the religious realists, there is a challenge of a different kind. It is 
to show how the thematization and conceptualization of God will main- 
tain God in transcendence and keep the Infinite in its infinity. The chal- 
lenge is particularly urgent for those realists who accept the thematiza- 
tion and conceptualization of God in a religious discourse, for example, 
Saint Anselm's God. It is to show how the God conceived in our finite 
minds transcends the finiteness of our minds. Levinas agrees that the 
"placing of the Idea of the Infinite within the finite, surpassing its capac- 
ity, as taught by Descartes, is one of the most remarkable expressions of 
transcendence."29 However, the challenge is to show that "the Idea of the 
Infinite" is not our idea, not a part of our thought, and that the placing 
of it in our minds is not our placing. If it were so, then even if God is 
described as infinite and transcendent, what we have is an infinity, a tran- 
scendence, that is contained in thought. It is of the same kind as the 
infinity and transcendence that, as Levinas himself reminds us, the Rus- 
sian astronaut Yuri Gagarin attributed to outer space (and declared that 
there was no God because he did not encounter God in space). For Levi- 
nas, this infinity is not truly infinite, and this transcendence turns out to 
be an immanence: "What an immanence! What a bad infinite!" (p. 8). By 
thinking of God ontologically, even as an Infinite and as wholly other 
than us, we are constructing, in fact, a God in the very heart of our being, 
in a way not all that different from the antirealist's construction of God. 
True transcendence, true Infinite, cannot be ontologically constructed: 
"The transcendence of God can neither be said nor thought in terms of 
being" (p. 77), and thus it is like the "One of the first hypothesis of Plato's 
Parmenides, which should 'neither be named, nor designated, nor opined, 
nor known' (142.a)" (p. 178). 
It is true that many modern realists are reluctant to specify the ways in 
29 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, p. 119. 
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which God may be conceived, or known. Some have chosen the "negative 
way" (via negativa). Nevertheless, the essence of realism lies in the belief 
that a transcendent and real God is the source of religious meaning and 
value and that to be religious is to stand in a relation with such God. 
Thus, a religious experience is an experience of God, no matter how that 
God comes to mind. The question is how it is that the infinity of the In- 
finite, the transcendence of God, is not circumscribed in such experi- 
ence. How is the glory of the Infinite glorified in the experience of a finite 
being? It is true that many modern realists urge that our attitude to God 
must be one of faith, not reason, and as a matter of faith, there is no need 
for conceptualization and thematization. However, faith in God is still a 
thought of God, and "once thought, this God is immediately situated 
within the 'gesture of being."'30 Levinas goes on, "in fact, . . . faith and 
opinion speak the language of being. Nothing is less opposed to ontology 
than the opinion of faith" (p. 57). 
To both realism and antirealism, the challenge from Levinas is to re- 
main faithful to Descartes's teaching that the transcendence of God is 
remarkably expressed in his placing of the idea of the Infinite within the 
finite. A religious discourse, whether realistic or antirealistic, that names 
God fails this challenge. If Levinas is right, then for both the realist and 
the antirealist "the religious being interprets what he lived through as 
experience [and as such] he already interprets God ... in terms of being, 
presence, and immanence."31 As if addressing both the realist and the 
antirealist, Levinas asks, "Does God signify a theme of a religious dis- 
course that names God, or as a discourse that precisely, at least at first 
sight, does not name him, but says him in another way than by denomina- 
tion or evocation?" (p. 62). We have seen how Levinas himself has man- 
aged to remain faithful to Descartes's teaching. He has pulled God "out 
of objectivity, out of presence and out of being" and pointed us in the 
direction of ethics. The God who comes to mind in ethics is gloriously 
transcendent and infinite precisely because ethics "is not a moment of 
being, it is otherwise than being; the very possibility of the beyond" (p. 
69). Given the fact that philosophy and theology have given us a God to 
be held in the very heart of being, in order to remain faithful to Des- 
cartes's teaching, it is necessary for Levinas to declare the death of the 
God of philosophy and theology and to substitute for it the God of ethics. 
This God is not thematized, or conceptualized, or thought, or directly 
experienced. The Infinite that belongs to this God is witnessed in the 
infinite of the saying of the Other. The glory of this God is glorified in 
the responsibility for the Other. 
30 Ibid., p. 56. 
31 Ibid., p. 62. 
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It may be asked whether the outcome of bringing Levinas to bear on 
the realist/antirealist debate really matters in the end, religiously speak- 
ing. It is beyond the scope of this article to show that it matters a great 
deal. I can only suggest at some possible reasons for thinking so. In the 
first place, participants on both sides of the debate clearly believe that the 
objections they raise against their opponents are important and that a 
great deal hangs on whether the objections can be accommodated. Thus, 
even if Cupitt is only half right in his historical account of realist religion, 
it matters a great deal to know whether we can move away from it, in 
any direction. We have seen that Cupitt's critics have protested that his 
portrayal of realist Christianity is at best a caricature. However, what is a 
caricature of a religious thinking could well be an accurate portrayal of 
the corresponding religious practice. If an objectionable practice draws 
support from a certain way of thinking, then perhaps there is a case for 
a revision of the thinking. On the other hand, it also matters a great deal 
whether one can be religious without some sense of the reality of God. 
For the antirealists, and particularly for the Wittgensteinian nonrealists, 
God is like the Wittgensteinian beetle in the box. But, surely, it matters a 
great deal what, if anything, is really in the box. If we cannot open the 
box lest the beetle, or whatever is in it, fly away, then we should at least 
try to rattle the box. The significance of Levinasian ethical religion lies in 
its potential to help us navigate between the Scylla of realism and the 
Charybdis of antirealism. 
More important, it can be shown why religion needs something like a 
Levinasian "other" if it is truly to embody care for the "Other." In addi- 
tion to Levinas's argument that it is the other that gives rise to the respon- 
sibility to the Other, we can say that it is the other that confers a dignity, 
or worth, on the Other, a quality that commands respect, in much the 
same way that rationality commands the Kantian respect for others as 
moral agents. Without this religious dimension, care for the Other will 
have to be underpinned by some "ism" or another, such as humanism or 
Kantianism. In rejecting realism, antirealists and nonrealists will have to 
find support in some other "ism." On the other hand, by reducing reli- 
gion to an "ism," the realists run the twin risk of not being responsive to 
the religious other and of succumbing to authoritarianism. One way of 
avoiding that risk is to open up to religious reality as "Other." As widows, 
orphans, strangers, the hungry, and the oppressed, the Other is not a 
source of authoritarianism, and given the Other's radical alterity, to re- 
spond to the Other is to be truly responsive to the other, to God. 
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